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To what extent do corporate tax rates determine where firms are located? New research
comparing two industries in Switzerland from Marius Brülhart, Mario Jametti and Kurt
Schmidheiny finds that the relative benefits to firms that are highly clustered mean that
they are less sensitive to higher tax rates. European governments will find it less costly to
raise corporate taxes in areas where industries are highly clustered.
Recent months have seen a public outcry in Europe over the levels of  tax paid by some
corporations. But is this urge to maximise prof its by seeking out low-tax locations the
same in all f irms? New evidence based on Swiss data shows that f irms in geographically
clustered industries are prepared to accept higher corporate tax burdens – presumably in
return f or being closer to the industry cluster. Through our research, we have f ound that
clustered sectors are about half  as sensit ive to tax rates as dispersed ones.
We looked at two sectors in Switzerland as part of  our research: the relatively dispersed
sof tware engineering industry and the relatively clustered watch-making industry. Figure 1
presents the geographical distribution of  existing f irms in sof tware engineering. Anyone
f amiliar with the geography of  Switzerland will see immediately that this is a relatively
dispersed industry.
Figure 1: Software engineering – Geographical distribution of f irms (1998)
Figure 2 then presents the raw correlation between corporate tax rates and “birth rates” of  new f irms in
that sector. As one would expect, higher corporate taxes mean a lower rate of  new f irms entering that
sector.
Figure 2: Software engineering – Firm births against municipal tax rates (1999-2001)
If  we turn to watch-making, an industry that is highly clustered in Western Switzerland (Figure 3), a
dif f erent pattern emerges.
Figure 3: Watch-Making – Geographical distribution of f irms (1998)
Figure 4 shows a posit ive – though not statistically signif icant – relationship between taxes and f irm
start-ups, suggesting that f irms in the watch-making industry are essentially insensitive to tax rates.
Figure 4: Watch-making – Firm births against municipal tax rates (1999-2001)
We then went beyond such simple correlations by estimating a location choice model of  f irm start-ups to
empirically assess the hypothesis that agglomeration (clustering) f orces can of f set regional dif f erences
in corporate tax burdens in determining where f irms were located. Using data on the industrial sector and
the geographical location of  Swiss start-up f irms f rom 1999 to 2002, we examined the geographical
concentration of  existing f irms and municipality- level corporate tax rates. This allowed us to estimate
how strongly start-up f irms sought to locate in low-tax locations and how this tendency varies with the
clustering intensity of  their industry.
Swiss cantons and municipalit ies are almost entirely f ree to set their individual corporate tax rates, which
leads to large variations in regional tax burdens. For example, the highest- tax canton applies a corporate
tax rate more than three times higher than that of  the lowest- tax canton. But apart f rom its exceptional
internal variation in tax burdens, Switzerland covers a relatively small, institutionally homogenous and
economically highly integrated territory. This makes it a usef ul setting f or testing the ef f ects of  regional
dif f erences in taxation.
The key challenge f or our research design was that f irms can participate in local polit ics and thereby
inf luence tax rates. Hence, local taxes can be both a cause and consequence of  f irms’ location choices.
As a result, we took a number of  analytical precautions to ascertain that what we measured was indeed
the causal ef f ect running f rom taxes to location choices and not the other way around. One such
precaution is our f ocus on start-up f irms only, since newly established f irms are much less likely than
incumbent f irms to af f ect pre-existing generally applicable local tax rates.
We f ound that the size of  the ef f ect of  clustering on tax sensit ivity is not trivial. Going back to our
illustrative example, our results predict that a one-percentage-point reduction in the tax rate would
attract 0.051 additional sof tware f irms, but only 0.023 additional watch-making f irms.
These f indings imply that there is less danger of  a global ‘race-to-the-bottom’ in corporate taxes than
there would be in the absence of  f orces that promote clustering. At the European level, this could mean
that the capacity to raise taxes in economically central locations – such as Germany, France and the UK
– may not be f undamentally threatened by low corporate taxes in Europe’s periphery in the south and
east.
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Related posts:
1. Cutting taxes is a largely inef f ective strategy f or attracting f oreign investment. (12.1)
2. To ensure Europe’s f uture competit iveness, policymakers must do more to integrate markets and
remove the barriers that are holding back new f irms and young innovators. (7)
3. Support f or saving the Euro within German industry is deeply split. Large exporters want to see the
Euro continue, small and f amily f irms do not. (7.8)
